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Abstract. This article critiques an investigative report officially intended (1) to establish the facts and
circumstances contributing to the April 20, 2001 interdiction of a United States (US) missionary
floatplane and the death of two US citizens and (2) to make recommendations to minimize another such
accident. The report was issued by the US Department of State Bureau for International Narcotics and
Law Enforcement Affairs.
A joint US-Peru program to deter and, if necessary, interdict airborne illicit drug operations ended in the
shootdown of an aircraft supporting religious missionary activity and in the death of two US citizens
related to this missionary activity. The theology of illicit drugs as Satan brought death and destruction
to supporters of another theology contra Satan.
Although one might employ this accident in advocacy against the joint US-Peru program and even
against the il-legalization of drugs, one might also read the US State Department investigative report
bearing on the accident to seek better implementation of the program and "the war against drugs."
Such readers might be as disappointed at what is in the report's six main conclusions as what is left out.
The most significant lacuna seems to be the absence of the political.
Conclusion #1. Program procedures described in implementing documents became less detailed and
explicit between the 1994 governmental agreement and the time of the shootdown. Response.
Political factors may well have induced wordsmithing for easier reading by bureaucratic authorities
hardpressed for time; time pressure for final versions of documents dictated by the political and
personal needs of bureaucratic authorities; and the intent to minimize political accountability in case
anything went wrong and to finesse political Issues pertaining to whom would be responsible for what
would, in turn, maintain political support for the program.
Conclusion #2. Program training focused on actions that would be effected after an aircraft would be
identified as transporting illicit drugs and on safety factors among program air assets--not between
these assets and putative drug-carrying aircraft. Response. A cardinal political factor may well have
included the lack of reliable and valid profiling indicators that would have differentiated drug-carrying
from non-drug-carrying aircraft with statistically and politically acceptable accuracy and error rates.
Another may have included the political pressure to look like the program was successful or having an
effect. With an unknowable base rate of illicit drug flights, numbers of forcedowns and shootdowns
could yield significant political mileage. On the other hand, the bureaucratic tendency to satisfice a
system by having zero forcedowns and shootdowns but a large number of air sorties would be
contraindicated by an inevitably "greater-than-zero" number of safety incidents just among program
aircraft. Yet another factor may have been the politically nurtured macho image of interceptor pilots
that would have lowered the threshold for effected interception.
Conclusion #3. Key participants in the April 20 shootdown narrowly viewed their operational roles and
"did not individually consider their actions from a broader, overall perspective." Response. A political
factor reinforcing such a view may well have included a very significant characteristic of political control
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of military, paramilitary, and law enforcement operations. This control strongly dictates a very narrow,
by-the-book approach to rules of engagement disengaged from a broader socio-cultural and political
context. This control also nurtures a training perspective wherein overlearned responses are highly
valued--again disengaged from a broader context.
Conclusion #4. Despite strong indications that the missionary aircraft was not engaged in illicit drug
trafficking, it was perceived as engaged in the latter. Response. There is significant politics both in what
the conclusion denotes and the conclusion itself. As to the latter, the conclusion smacks of ex post facto
analysis because the indicators of what might look like missionary, non-drug, and drug-related activity
are problematic. (See Conclusion #2). As to the former, Conclusions #2 and #3 would suggest that what
looks like a drug-carrying aircraft will be identified as such an aircraft, while what looks like a missionary
or other non-drug aircraft still will be identified as a drug-carrying aircraft via intermediary inferences
such as the putative presence of adversary deceptive practices.
Conclusion #5. Language limitations--exacerbated in a stressful situation--among US and Peruvian
program participants deleteriously affected information flow, processing, and comprehension.
Response. A political factor might well have included personnel criteria about the need for bilingualism
in combined operations interacting with nationalism, ethnocentrism, chauvinism, and jingoism.
Conclusion #6. Communications systems overload and "cumbersome procedures" contributed to
impeding compliance with applicable directives. Response. As Conclusion # 1 suggests, international
and domestic politics may well have impeded the mindset ensuring compatibility among
communications systems, procedures, and directives.
In conclusion, the US State Department report focuses on discrete and seemingly dysfunctional
intrapsychic and behavioral contributors to the April 20 shootdown. As is the case with aviation
accident investigations in general, the report does not focus on political contributors to these
contributors--a lack of focus that renders the report very political indeed. (See Cullen, S.A. (1998).
Aviation suicide: A review of general aviation accidents in the U.K., 1970-96. Aviation, Space, &
Environmental Medicine, 69, 6969-698; O'Hare, D., Wiggins, M., Batt, R., & Morrison, D. (1994).
Cognitive failure analysis for aircraft accident investigation. Ergonomics, 37, 1855-1869; Symer, C.J.
(1999). Impact of silence: A discourse analysis of black box miscommunications of three fatal flights.
Dissertation Abstracts International: Section B: the Sciences & Engineering, 60(1-B), 0400; U.S.
Department of State. (August 2, 2001). Peru investigation report: The April 20, 2001 Peruvian
shootdown accident. http://www.fas.org/irp/news/2001/08/peru_shootdown.html; Yanowitch, R.E.,
Mohler, S.R., & Nichols, E.A. (1972). The psychosocial reconstruction inventory: A postdictal instrument
in aircaft accident investigation. FAA Office of Aviation Medicine Reports, 72-25.)(Keywords: Illicit Drug,
Peru.)
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